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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Benjamin Reynolds,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
American National Red Cross; 
American Red Cross Greenbrier 
Valley Chapter; Walter M. 
Lockhart,
Defendants-Appellees, > 
and
American Red Cross National 
Headquarters, Washington, DC; 
American Red Cross Mid­
Atlantic Service Area, Raleigh,
NC; Nikki McBain, Chapter 
Solutions Manager, Raleigh, NC,
Defendants.
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Benjamin Reynolds,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
American National Red Cross; 
American Red Cross Greenbrier 
Valley Chapter; Walter M. 
Lockhart,
Defendants-Appellants, > 
and
American Red Cross National 
Headquarters, Washington, DC; 
American Red Cross Mid­
Atlantic Service Area, Raleigh,
NC; Nikki McBain, Chapter 
Solutions Manager, Raleigh, NC,
Defendants.
No. 11-2280
Appeals from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley. 
Irene C. Berger, District Judge. 
(5:10-cv-00443)
Argued: October 4, 2012
Decided: December 7, 2012
Before KING, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
No. 11-2278 affirmed in part and vacated in part; No. 11-2280 
dismissed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the 
opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Keenan joined.
Appeal: 11-2278 Doc: 38 Filed: 12/07/2012 Pg: 3 of 22
Reynolds v. American National Red Cross 3
COUNSEL
Sean Willard Cook, MEYER FORD GLASSER & RAD- 
MAN, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant/Cross- 
Appellee. Constantinos George Panagopoulos, BALLARD 
SPAHR, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees/Cross- 
Appellants. *I.
OPINION
THACKER, Circuit Judge:
Benjamin S. Reynolds ("Appellant") appeals the district 
court’s award of summary judgment in favor of the American 
National Red Cross and the American Red Cross Greenbrier 
Valley Chapter (collectively, "Appellees"). The district court 
held that Reynolds failed to submit sufficient evidence to 
meet his burden with regard to various Americans with Dis­
abilities Act ("ADA") claims. Despite their victory below, 
Appellees nonetheless cross-appeal on the ancillary issue of 
whether the number of employees of the National Red Cross 
and the Greenbrier Valley Chapter can be aggregated for pur­
poses of determining "employer" status under the ADA. For 
the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s award of 
summary judgment to Appellees, vacate the district court’s 
ruling that the Greenbrier Valley Chapter is an "employer" 
under the ADA, and dismiss the cross-appeal.
I.
A.
Reynolds worked for the Greenbrier Valley Chapter of the 
American Red Cross in Lewisburg, West Virginia (the "Chap­
ter"). He began as a volunteer in 1994 and then worked as a 
per diem instructor beginning in 2004, being paid for each
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health/safety, first aid, and CPR class he taught. He eventually 
became a part-time employee in 2005. For the entire time he 
was with the Chapter, Reynolds worked directly for Walter 
M. Lockhart, Executive Director.1 Reynolds and Lockhart met 
some years previously when they both volunteered with the 
Civil Air Patrol. They interacted socially "every few days," 
J.A. 509,1 2 and Lockhart loaned Reynolds around $6,000 over 
the course of their friendship.
In 2006, Lockhart offered Reynolds a full-time job with the 
chapter as a "Manager of Service Delivery," a job description 
that Lockhart drafted himself, and Reynolds accepted. Reyn­
olds began work in that position on or about August 1, 2006. 
The job description provided, "[j]ob is physically comfort­
able; individual has discretion about walking, standing, etc." 
J.A. 114.31. It also required Reynolds to "[t]each[ ] training 
courses as necessary" and "recruit[ ] and retain[ ] volunteer 
instructors for community classes and mission related 
courses." Id. at 114.28, 114.30. The parties agree "90% of 
[Reynolds’s] job was to teach health and safety classes. How­
ever, [he] was also tasked with recruiting or soliciting training 
classes from the community." Id. at 763. The salary was listed 
at $23,600.00 annually with no benefits.3
1 Reynolds sued Lockhart as well, but Lockhart was dismissed by a pre­
vious order of the district court. See Reynolds v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, No. 
5:10-cv-00443, 2011 WL 4479054 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 26, 2011). Reyn­
olds is not appealing that order.
2Citations to the "J.A." refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties 
in this appeal.
3There was some discussion amongst Reynolds and the Chapter regard­
ing an employment requirement that Reynolds solicit enough training 
classes to be able to cover his salary. There is a dispute, however, as to 
whether this requirement was, in fact, implemented, and, if so, the period 
of time in which Reynolds would have had to meet the requirement. Reyn­
olds claims, "my understanding was that if that [the requirement] was 
implemented, that I had a year from the date that I started that job to 
accomplish that." J.A. at 496. Instead, Reynolds was terminated after only 
six months of full time employment.
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On or about August 5 or 6, 2006, during the first week that 
Reynolds worked as Manager of Service Delivery, Lockhart 
instructed Reynolds to help move a baby grand piano from the 
home of a donor to Lockhart's personal residence. Lockhart 
and Robert Clark, a member of the Chapter’s Executive Com­
mittee, also helped. Reynolds alleges that he experienced "se­
vere pain in both his neck and upper back" when he started 
moving the piano. Am. Compl. ^ 14.4 Clark testified, "when 
we got into the process of moving the piano [Reynolds said,] 
‘boy, my back really hurts’. So we say, ‘then don’t touch the 
piano’." J.A. 703. Clark said he "strongly advised [Reynolds] 
not to help." Id. Reynolds alleges, however, that Lockhart "ig­
nored [his] plea [to stop moving the piano] and required him 
to continue assisting in delivering and unloading the piano to 
his personal residence." Am. Compl. ^ 15. Reynolds admitted 
that prior to this incident, his back was "stiff and sore because 
he had previously moved mattresses for the Chapter." J.A. 
763.
Reynolds alleges that after the piano incident he went to the 
emergency room "a few days later . . . to seek relief from the 
persistent and severe pain in his neck and upper back." Am. 
Compl. ^ 16.5 He saw two physicians, Dr. Boisverte and Dr. 
Kribs, both in Lewisburg, who eventually referred him to Dr. 
Dilaawar Mistry at the University of Virginia Health System 
in Charlottesville. Because Reynolds’s car had been repos­
sessed and he had no other way to get to the appointment, 
Lockhart drove Reynolds to Charlottesville to see Dr. Mistry 
on September 7, 2006.
4The Amended Complaint is found at J.A. 40-54.
5During his deposition Reynolds admitted to going to the emergency 
room on August 4, 2006, which was before the piano moving incident. For 
the purpose of the Motion for Summary Judgment, however, Appellees 
assumed that the alleged back injury was due to the piano lifting incident. 
Therefore, this Court likewise makes that assumption for the purpose of 
this appeal.
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Dr. Mistry examined Reynolds and noted he "complain[ed] 
of persistent left arm pain." J.A. 116-17. The physical exami­
nation showed, however, "[n]ormal range of motion and 
strength in flexion, extension and axial rotation of the neck. 
Normal range of motion and strength of both shoulders, 
elbows and wrists. There was mild sensory loss on the tip of 
the index finger of the left hand compared to the right." Id. at 
117. Dr. Mistry also noted, in the "history" portion of the 
report, that Reynolds’s X-ray showed "intervertebral disk 
space narrowing with osteophytic change most pronounced at 
C5-C6 and C6-C7" and "some foraminal encroachment sec­
ondary to osteophytes bilaterally." Id. at 116. Dr. Mistry 
scheduled an m Ri  to be performed in Charlottesville, made a 
follow-up appointment on September 19, 2006, and gave 
Reynolds a note stating that he could return to work "with 
restrictions that include lifting weights only up to 15 pounds." 
Id. Dr. Mistry testified that due to Reynolds’s
normal range of motion and strength of his shoul­
ders, elbows and wrists, . . . [and] neck and 
flexion/extension, axial rotation, and his indication 
that he needs to return to work for the Red Cross, I 
felt as a clinician that up to 15 pounds would be rea­
sonable to let him continue his work. . . .
Id. at 328.
After the examination, Dr. Mistry said Reynolds had "no 
physical limitations as far as range of motion" and he "would 
[not] consider [Reynolds] disabled." J.A. 333. Reynolds never 
returned to Charlottesville for his follow-up appointment or 
MRI. Therefore, Dr. Mistry had no occasion to determine if 
the fifteen-pound lifting restriction that he imposed was still 
appropriate weeks later.
Reynolds claims that after he returned to work, he was 
asked to lift things in excess of fifteen pounds, despite Lock­
hart’s knowledge of Dr. Mistry’s orders. Upon their return to
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Lewisburg, Lockhart "instructed [Reynolds] to assist with 
moving boxes, mattresses, furniture and a five-drawer file 
cabinet. [Reynolds] estimated that he lifted items weighing 
more than fifteen pounds two to three times a week." J.A. 
765, 533. Notably, however, Reynolds "never refused Lock­
hart's instruction to lift any item while he was under the 
restriction" and "could recall only one conversation when he 
told Lockhart that he believed that moving a loaded file cabi­
net would be too heavy for him." Id. at 765-66, 540.
After allegedly sustaining the above-described back and 
neck injuries,6 Reynolds twice told Lockhart he wanted to file 
a workers’ compensation claim. Reynolds stated that Lockhart 
told him that if he did so, "[he] would be dismissed and that 
the Red Cross would fight [the claim]." Id. at 488. Lockhart 
also told him the Chapter’s Executive Committee "[isn’t] 
going to let you do that," and a workers’ compensation claim 
"would cost the chapter either one or one-and-a-half percent 
rate increase hike" and the Chapter "wouldn’t stand for that." 
Id. at 490.
B.
At some point before the end of 2006, the Chapter deter­
mined that it no longer had the funds to pay Reynolds, and 
Reynolds was so advised. Then, on or around January 28, 
2007, Lockhart verbally informed Reynolds that he was ter­
minated because the Chapter did not have the funds to pay 
him. On January 30, 2007, Reynolds received a termination 
letter from Lockhart stating, "[d]ue to budget restriction [sic] 
the Board of Director [sic] has asked me to termination [sic] 
your employment with this chapter as of today." The letter 
continued,
6Reynolds also claims that he was disabled because he had "a blood dis­
order" which led to erectile dysfunction, but offered no medical support 
in the record for this allegation nor any indication as to how this alleged 
disorder rendered him disabled. Br. of Appellant 26-27.
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We are exercising our rights as an "at will 
employer." As you know this had been the balance 
for the last ninety day [sic], hoping you would gener­
ate enough income to cover your salary. This has not 
been done. Also the single family files has [sic] not 
been entered into the CAS system, since July 2006. 
only about fifty percent of the instructor [sic] in 
health and safety has been upgraded.
J.A. 120.
As noted, there is some dispute as to whether Reynolds was 
required to bring in enough money to cover his salary as a 
part of his employment. It is undisputed that Reynolds did not 
receive any negative evaluations or reprimands related to his 
job performance prior to his termination.
C.
After his termination from the Chapter, Reynolds applied 
for and was denied West Virginia workers’ compensation 
benefits for his alleged back and neck injuries because his 
application was untimely. He then filed a disability discrimi­
nation charge against the Chapter with the Equal Opportunity 
Employment Commission ("EEOC") based on those alleged 
injuries. He claimed that he was "harassed, retaliated against, 
treated differently from others, denied a reasonable accommo­
dation, and unlawfully discharged based on his disability." 
J.A. 768.
In March 2008, Reynolds obtained a teaching position in 
North Carolina. He earned $43,000 per year, plus full bene­
fits. While at that job, Reynolds moved 195 books on a book 
cart down a ramp. He tried to push the cart in front of him, 
but it was "extremely heavy," so he tried to get in front of the 
cart. The cart "got away from [him]" and "basically ran [him] 
over." J.A. 442-43. After that incident, Reynolds filed for 
worker’s compensation benefits, and he has been receiving
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those benefits from the state of North Carolina since August 
21, 2008.
On December 30, 2009, the EEOC determined that the 
Chapter was not an ADA covered employer and dismissed 
Reynolds’s EEOC claim. Reynolds then filed this action in 
district court.
Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing 
Reynolds did not present sufficient evidence to prove he was 
disabled and, in any event, the Chapter was not an "employer" 
under the ADA. The district court ruled in favor of Appellees 
as to the former but against Appellees on the latter. It held 
that, even though the Chapter employed fewer than fifteen 
people—the threshold number of employees required to 
invoke the ADA—the Chapter nonetheless was an "agent" of 
the American National Red Cross, a covered employer under 
the ADA. See Reynolds v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, No. 5:10-cv- 
00443 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 17, 2011), ECF N o. 88.7 Reynolds 
filed a timely appeal, and Appellees filed a cross-appeal on 
the agency issue alone.
II.
We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling de 
novo, applying the same standard applied by the district court. 
See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011); Med. 
Waste Assocs. Ltd. v. Mayor & City Council o f Baltimore, 966 
F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1992). Summary judgment is appro­
priate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the 
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. Id. On a motion for summary judgment, "facts must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts." Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
7The district court’s opinion is found at J.A. 761-94.
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III.
The ADA provides, "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, 
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job train­
ing, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ­
ment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). "Covered entity" is defined as 
"an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or 
joint labor-management committee." Id. § 12111(2). "Em­
ployer" is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affect­
ing commerce who has 15 or more employees . . . , and any 
agent of such person[.]" Id. § 12111(5)(A).
A. The Appeal
Reynolds appeals three ADA claims on which the district 
court awarded summary judgment: (1) he was fired because 
of his alleged disability (the "primary ADA claim"); (2) he 
was retaliated against for engaging in protected activities 
under the ADA (the "retaliation claim"); and (3) his employer 
shared confidential medical information about his alleged dis­
ability (the "confidentiality claim"). We address each in turn 
below.
1. The Primary ADA Claim
To survive summary judgment on the primary ADA claim, 
Reynolds was required to produce evidence sufficient to dem­
onstrate that (1) he "was a qualified individual with a disabil­
ity"; (2) he "was discharged"; (3) he "was fulfilling h[is] 
employer's legitimate expectations at the time of discharge"; 
and (4) "the circumstances of h[is] discharge raise a reason­
able inference of unlawful discrimination." Rohan v. Net­
works Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 273 n.9 (4th Cir. 
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence of all four 
of these elements is necessary to survive summary judgment. 
Reynolds’ claim fails at step one.
Appeal: 11-2278 Doc: 38 Filed: 12/07/2012 Pg: 11 of 22
Reynolds v. American National Red Cross 11
Reynolds was first required "to produce evidence that [he] 
is . . . disabled." Rohan, 375 F.3d at 272. The ADA defines 
disability as any one of the following: "(A) a physical or men­
tal impairment that substantially limits one or more . . . major 
life activities . . . ; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(2); see also Rohan, 375 F.3d at 273. As explained 
below, because Reynolds does not produce sufficient evi­
dence to satisfy this element of the claim, we need not go fur­
ther.
a.
Given that Reynolds’s alleged disability occurred in 2006, 
in deciding whether Reynolds produced sufficient evidence of 
a disability, we must first decide whether to apply retroac­
tively the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (the "ADAAA"), 
which took effect January 1, 2009. See ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, § 8; 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (Sept. 25, 2008).
In passing the ADAAA, Congress was concerned "lower 
courts have incorrectly found in individual cases that people 
with a range of substantially limiting impairments are not 
people with disabilities." 122 Stat. at 3553. Congress believed 
that over time, ADA case law "eliminate[d] protection for 
many individuals whom Congress intended to protect." Id.
Before the enactment of the ADAAA, courts relied upon 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 
U.S. 184 (2002), and Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471 (1999), in determining whether a plaintiff was dis­
abled. These cases defined the terms "substantially" and 
"major," as used in the ADA definition of disability, "to be 
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualify­
ing as disabled[.]" Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
The Toyota Court held, in order to qualify as disabled 
under the ADA, "an individual must have an impairment that
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prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activi­
ties that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives. 
The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long 
term." 534 U.S. at 198. The Court continued,
it is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove 
disability status under this test to merely submit evi­
dence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment. 
Instead, the ADA requires those claiming the Act’s 
protection . . . to prove a disability by offering evi­
dence that the extent of the limitation [caused by 
their impairment] in terms of their own experience 
. . . is substantial.
Id.; see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 ("A ‘disability’ exists 
only where an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life 
activity, not where it ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or ‘would’ be substan­
tially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.").
The district court decided — as have eight circuits—that 
the ADAAA does not apply retroactively and instead, relied 
on Toyota and Sutton in ruling on Reynolds’ claim. See Car­
ter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., 662 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (declining to impose the ADAAA retroactively); 
Nyrop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 616 F.3d 728, 734 n.4 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (same); Becerril v. Pima Cnty. Assessor’s Office, 
587 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009) (same); Thornton v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 35 n.3 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(same); Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 581 F.3d 516, 
521 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009) (same); Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer 
Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 942 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (same); Millholland 
v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. o f Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 565 (6th Cir. 
2009) (same); EEOC v. Agro Distribution LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 
469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009) (same).8
8This court has also held the same in an unpublished opinion. See Coch­
ran v. Holder, 436 F. App’x 227 (4th Cir. June 21, 2011).
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The Supreme Court has held, "[R]etroactivity is not favored 
in the law[.] [C]ongressional enactments and administrative 
rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless 
their language requires this result." Landgraf v. Usi Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994). The ADAAA itself pro­
vides "[t]his Act and the amendment made by this Act shall 
become effective on January 1, 2009." 122 Stat. at 3559. In 
Cochran, this court concluded that the amendment "evinces a 
prospective intent with its delayed effective date." 436 F. 
App’x at 232. We agree: there is no language in the ADAAA 
indicating that Congress intended to make this law retroac­
tive; in fact, the indication is to the contrary.
Reynolds nonetheless contends that although the ADAAA 
was not in effect at the time the conduct giving rise to this 
case occurred, it was in full effect when the district court ren­
dered its decision below (October 17, 2011), and it should be 
applied for that reason. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273 ("[I]n 
many situations, a court should apply the law in effect at the 
time it renders its decision, even though that law was enacted 
after the events that gave rise to the suit." (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted)). But Landgraf resolved,
[P]rospectivity remains the appropriate default rule. 
Because it accords with widely held intuitions about 
how statutes ordinarily operate, a presumption 
against retroactivity will generally coincide with leg­
islative and public expectations. Requiring clear 
intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively 
considered the potential unfairness of retroactive 
application and determined that it is an acceptable 
price to pay for the countervailing benefits. Such a 
requirement allocates to Congress responsibility for 
fundamental policy judgments concerning the proper 
temporal reach of statutes, and has the additional vir­
tue of giving legislators a predictable background 
rule against which to legislate.
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511 U.S. at 272-73; see also Carter, 662 F.3d at 1144 (declin­
ing to apply the ADAAA retroactively because it went into 
effect after "the allegedly discriminatory conduct in this case 
occurred"); Thornton, 587 F.3d at 35 n.3 (explaining that the 
ADAAA does not apply retroactively to "conduct occurring 
before the Act became effective").
For these reasons, we join the majority of the circuits in 
deciding the ADAAA does not apply retroactively. Therefore, 
we will instead look to Toyota, Sutton, and their progeny.
b.
We first consider whether Reynolds provided evidence on 
the first ADA definition of disability: whether he had a physi­
cal impairment that substantially limited one or more major 
life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Reynolds primar­
ily cites "lifting" as the major life activity in which he is sub­
stantially limited due to his alleged back and neck injuries. 
Federal regulations have established that lifting is a major life 
activity, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1), but Reynolds fails to 
show how he has been "substantially limited" in this regard. 
Reynolds has not shown that his alleged injuries have "pre­
vented] or severely restrict[ed]" him "from doing activities 
that are of central importance to most people's daily lives." 
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198. He has also not shown any evidence 
that these injuries are "permanent or long term." Id.
In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Reynolds continued 
to lift things upon his return to work; he did not return to Dr. 
Mistry (or to any doctor) for a determination that his lifting 
restriction of fifteen pounds should be permanent; and even at 
his new job in North Carolina, he took on the task of trans­
porting 195 books, which signals that he did not believe him­
self to be limited in the activity of lifting. Moreover, the only 
medical evidence Reynolds provides regarding his alleged 
limitation is a three-page medical report from Dr. Mistry. 
Coupled with Dr. Mistry’s testimony that he did not believe
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Reynolds to be disabled, this evidence does not demonstrate 
that Reynolds was substantially limited in the life activity of 
lifting.
Reynolds’s argument is further undercut by this court’s 
decision in Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 
101 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by 
Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999). 
There, this court held, "a twenty-five pound lifting limitation 
—particularly when compared to an average person’s abilities 
—does not constitute a significant restriction on one’s ability 
to lift, work, or perform any other major life activity." Id. at 
349. In 2002, this court again found that "mild limitations" 
such as "the restriction[ ] that [the plaintiff] not lift more than 
twenty-five pounds or bend repetitively . . . are not signifi­
cantly restricting . . . under the ADA." Pollard v. High’s of 
Baltimore, Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 2002); see also 
Colwell v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 639, 644 
(2d Cir. 1998) (inability to lift "very heavy objects" or "any­
thing heavy" was insufficient to establish a substantial limita­
tion on ability to lift as compared to the average person); 
Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir. 
1997) ("While lifting is noted under the regulations as a major 
life activity, a general lifting restriction imposed by a physi­
cian, without more, is insufficient to constitute a disability 
within the meaning of the ADA."). Therefore, Reynolds has 
not satisfied the first definition of "disabled" under the ADA.9
c.
We next address whether Reynolds has satisfied the second 
definition of disability: having "a record of' a physical 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
9To the extent Reynolds cites other disabilities (i.e., a blood disorder 
leading to erectile dysfunction) and other life activities in which he was 
limited (i.e., working), the record is void of any evidence to support ADA 
claims based on such allegations.
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activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). On this point, Reynolds 
bends over backwards to argue that he has provided "a 
record"—that is, literally one medical record—and this should 
be sufficient to satisfy this requirement.
However, under the applicable definition, we must consider 
if Reynolds has "a history of, or has been misclassified as 
having, a . . . physical impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities." Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 391 (inter­
nal quotation marks omitted). Reynolds’s single proffered 
medical report is, at best, inconclusive as to the history and 
extent of his alleged disability, despite the fact that he alludes 
to "voluminous [medical] records," particularly when this sin­
gle medical record is coupled with the fact that the doctor 
who wrote it, Dr. Mistry, testified that he did not believe 
Reynolds to be disabled. Br. of Appellant 30. Indeed, Reyn­
olds admits he did not provide all relevant medical informa­
tion, stating,
It is true that all of the records of Mr. Reynolds’ 
entire medical history were not included as exhibits 
in his response to summary judgment below. How­
ever, the presentment of these voluminous records is 
unnecessary for purposes of this analysis. It is not 
the substance of these records that is significant in 
order to reach a decision under this second prong of 
the ADA’s definition of a disability. Instead, it is the 
existence of these records that is consequential here, 
and the existence of these records is undisputed.
Id. (emphasis in original). Contrary to Reynolds’s bold asser­
tion, unless the purported medical records were placed in the 
record — which they admittedly were not — they do not, in 
fact, exist for the purpose of this appeal. Therefore, by his 
admission, Reynolds acknowledges that he failed to satisfy 
his burden of production. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 
557, 586 (2009) ("[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, the nonmoving
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party bears the burden of production under Rule 56 to desig­
nate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial." (internal quotation marks omitted)). We therefore con­
clude Reynolds does not satisfy the second definition of dis­
ability.
d.
Finally, Reynolds argues he was, at least, "regarded as" 
having a physical impairment that substantially limited one or 
more major life activities, thus satisfying the third definition 
of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). Reynolds must show 
that his employer "mistakenly believe[d] that [he] ha[d] a 
physical impairment that substantially limit[ed]" his ability to 
lift or work. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. To the contrary, Lock­
hart expected Reynolds to continue lifting things at work, and 
Reynolds continued to do so. Lockhart testified that Reynolds 
had complained of back pain and his blood disorder through­
out the time he knew him, but there is no further evidence 
Lockhart believed these conditions substantially limited 
Reynolds’s ability to lift or work. Reynolds also points to tes­
timony from Clark, specifically that he told Reynolds not to 
move the baby grand piano because of his back pain. But this 
statement is nothing more than one of concern for a co­
worker, which is simply not enough to satisfy this definition 
of disability.
Therefore, Reynolds comes up short on each of the three 
ADA definitions of disability, and we affirm the judgment of 
the district court with regard to the primary ADA claim.10
10Even if we were obliged to apply the ADAAA to the facts of this case, 
Reynolds has not proven that he is disabled under its broader definition of 
"disability." The Ad AAA retains the "substantial limitation" language, but 
it requires a lesser "degree of limitation" than that imposed by Toyota. 122 
Stat. at 3553-54. "Substantially limits" no longer means "significantly 
restricted." Id. at 3554. Although the revisions are somewhat vague, any 
findings of disability should be interpreted "consistently with the findings
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2. The Retaliation Claim
Reynolds also claims he was terminated by Lockhart and 
the Chapter in retaliation for (a) requesting that he not be 
required to lift items exceeding fifteen pounds in weight, and 
(b) mentioning that he wanted to file a workers’ compensation 
claim.
The ADA’s retaliation provision provides, in relevant part, 
"[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because 
such individual . . . made a charge . . . under this chapter." 42 
U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish a prima facie retaliation claim 
under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove (1) he engaged in pro­
tected conduct, (2) he suffered an adverse action, and (3) a 
causal link exists between the protected conduct and the 
adverse action. See A Soc’y  Without a Name v. Common­
wealth o f Va., 655 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2011). Importantly, 
a plaintiff is not required to prove the conduct he opposed was 
actually an ADA violation. Rather, he must show he had a 
"good faith belief" the conduct violated the ADA. Freilich v. 
Upper Chesapeake Health, 313 F.3d 205, 216 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(internal citations omitted).
As to Reynolds’s first grounds for retaliation, his alleged 
protected conduct is his request that Lockhart honor the 
fifteen-pound lifting restriction imposed by Dr. Mistry. He 
claims Lockhart nonetheless required him to move items in 
excess of the limitation. Even assuming that Reynolds met the 
first two prongs to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, 
as the district court observed, Reynolds "has not proffered any 
. . . citation to the record demonstrating that there is ‘evi-
and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008" which include 
"eliminating] discrimination" of disabled persons. Id. at 3554-56. Based 
on the record before us, and for the reasons stated supra, Reynolds does 
not advance evidence sufficient to show that he is disabled or is the type 
of plaintiff intended to be covered under the original version of the ADA 
or under the ADAAA.
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dence’ of a link between the protected activity and his termi­
nation . . . ." J.A. 792. On appeal, Reynolds has similarly 
failed to cite to any evidence on the causation element of the 
ADA retaliation claim. Therefore, the retaliation claim based 
on Reynolds’s lifting restriction fails.
The retaliation claim based on Reynolds’s workers’ com­
pensation inquiry also fails. The ADA’s retaliation provision 
only prohibits retaliation against a person because the person 
"opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter" 
or "made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (emphases added). Filing a 
workers’ compensation claim is not something that is covered 
by the ADA, but rather by retaliation provisions under state 
law. See W. Va. Code § 23-5A-1 ("No employer shall dis­
criminate in any manner against any of his present or former 
employees because of such present or former employee’s 
receipt of or attempt to receive benefits under this chapter."). 
Thus, Reynolds’s retaliation claim based on his workers’ 
compensation request likewise fails.
3. The Confidentiality Claim
Finally, Reynolds argues, "information obtained regarding 
the medical condition or history [of an employee must be] 
collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate 
medical files and is treated as a confidential medical record." 
Br. of Appellant 33 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B)) 
(alteration in original). He argues that Lockhart violated this 
provision of the ADA by disclosing his "thick blood" medical 
condition to "unauthorized individuals." Id. at 34.
Again, Reynolds does not have the evidence to support this 
claim. First, Reynolds does not fit within the parameters of 
this subsection, which applies to "job applicants]." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(d)(3). But even assuming Reynolds had cited to the 
more applicable subsection, which prohibits "mak[ing] [medi-
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cal] inquiries of an employee," id. § 12112(d)(4)(A), the 
record clearly shows Reynolds disclosed his medical condi­
tion voluntarily to Lockhart, who by all accounts was Reyn­
olds’s friend. Lockhart then disclosed the information to 
another person in order to help Reynolds find a doctor, not for 
"job-related" purposes. Id. Therefore, the district court prop­
erly granted summary judgment on this issue.
B. The Cross-Appeal
We turn finally to the cross-appeal of the Appellees, where 
they assert the Chapter and the National Red Cross could not 
be aggregated in order to meet the fifteen employee threshold 
required for an "employer" under the ADA. As an initial mat­
ter, we are satisfied that the issue of whether the Chapter is 
an "employer" under the ADA is non-jurisdictional in nature. 
Previously, we treated the numerosity requirements of the 
ADA and other employment discrimination statutes as juris­
dictional. See Hukill v. Auto Care, Inc., 192 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 
1999) (vacating district court’s judgment and remanding with 
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where defen­
dant was not an "employer"). However, this approach does 
not survive Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
There, the Supreme Court ruled "the threshold number of 
employees for application of Title VII is an element of a 
plaintiff’ s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue." Id. at 
516.
Although we have never applied Arbaugh to the ADA, 
courts often look to Title VII—which defines "employer" in 
essentially the same way as the ADA—for guidance on ADA 
issues. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a) with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(b); see also Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book 
Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 992 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Because 
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA define ‘employer’ essen­
tially the same way, we rely on case law developed under all 
three statutes." (internal quotation marks omitted)); EEOC v. 
AIC Sec. Investigations, 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 (7th Cir. 1995)
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("Courts routinely apply arguments regarding individual lia­
bility to all three statutes interchangeably."). Thus, Arbaugh 
dictates that the ADA’s employee threshold is not a limit on 
jurisdiction but, rather, an element of the claim itself.
Next, we conclude that the cross-appeal was not properly 
taken. A cross-appeal is unnecessary where an appellee 
"seek[s] nothing more than to preserve [a] judgment in [its] 
favor." Vogel v. Linde, 23 F.3d 78, 79 n.3 (4th Cir. 1994); see 
also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. o f Pittsburgh, Pa. v. W. Lake 
Acad., 548 F.3d 8, 23 (1st Cir. 2008) ("‘A cross-appeal nor­
mally is improper when taken by a defendant from a favorable 
judgment.’") (quoting United States v. Moran, 393 F.3d 1, 12 
(1st Cir. 2004)). Here, the cross-appeal on whether the Chap­
ter is an "employer" is unnecessary, as it merely seeks affir­
mance of the district court’s judgment on an alternate ground. 
Therefore, the cross-appeal must be dismissed. See Nat’l 
Union, 548 F.3d at 23 (dismissing cross-appeal from a favor­
able judgment).
Finally, we vacate the district court’s ruling on the 
employee aggregation issue. Our decision to uphold the dis­
trict court’s grant of summary judgment on the merits of the 
ADA claim renders moot the dispute concerning whether the 
Chapter is an "employer." This is because, having affirmed 
the district court’s judgment, our resolution of the question of 
whether the Chapter is an "employer" would have no practical 
effect on the outcome of this matter. See Norfolk S. Ry Co. v. 
City Of Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 161 (4th Cir. 2010) ("A 
dispute is moot when the parties lack a legally cognizable 
interest in the outcome. And the parties lack such an interest 
when, for example, our resolution of an issue could not possi­
bly have any practical effect on the outcome of the matter.") 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "The cus­
tomary practice when a case is rendered moot on appeal is to 
vacate the moot aspects of the lower court’s judgment." Id. 
Accordingly, the district court’s ruling that the Chapter is an 
"employer" under the ADA must be vacated.
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IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the district court’s award of sum­
mary judgment to Appellees is affirmed, its ruling that the 
Chapter is an "employer" under the ADA is vacated, and the 
cross-appeal is dismissed.
No. 11-2278 AFFIRMED IN PART 
AND VACATED IN PART; 
No. 11-2280 DISMISSED
